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Highlights 22 
Commentary on the work cited in the title, published in the journal Applied Energy. 23 
This work significantly exaggerates the impacts of shale gas development in the UK. 24 
The first cause of exaggeration is underestimation of gas production per well. 25 
The second is the assumption that ‘dirty’ practices that are illegal will be adopted. 26 
Accurate information is readily available and should have underpinned this work. 27 
 28 
A B S T R A C T 29 
In the recent work entitled ‘‘Life cycle environmental impacts of UK shale gas” (Applied Energy, 134 30 
(2014) 506–518) Stamford and Azapagic [1] make a first attempt at quantifying a range of overall 31 
lifecycle impacts of shale gas production in the UK. Their analysis led to some very unfavourable 32 
comparisons with other energy technologies and concluded that, for three types of impact 33 
(depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, photochemical pollution, and terrestrial eco-toxicity), 34 
shale gas is ‘worse’ even than coal as an energy source for generating electricity; furthermore, 35 
uncertainties in input data mean that it might also be worse than coal for three additional impacts 36 
(on global warming, acidification, and human toxicity). One of their principal inferences is, therefore, 37 
that shale gas development in the UK should be subject to stringent environmental regulation, to 38 
ensure that it is only developed where it can be demonstrated to regulatory authorities on a well-by-39 
well basis that these and other impacts can be minimized. The present commentary reassesses some 40 
of the conclusions reached by this published analysis.  41 
 42 
1. Discussion 43 
We see three fundamental difficulties regarding the Stamford and Azapagic [1] analysis. First, it 44 
determines impacts in terms of each unit of gas production rather than in absolute terms. The 45 
environmental impact of each drilling operation can be estimated with confidence, but by making 46 
unfavourable assumptions regarding the gas production from an individual well, disproportionate 47 
impacts (per unit of gas production) are inferred. Although this point is noted in the body of the 48 
paper, it is not mentioned in the abstract, the Conclusions section, or the research highlights. The 49 
paper indeed considers ‘best’, ‘central’, and ‘worst’ case scenarios, but the first of these are hardly 50 
discussed in their text. The ‘best’ case results are illustrated in Fig. 4 of Stamford and Azapagic, 51 
where their results are presented graphically, as the lower limits of ‘error bars’, but this style of 52 
presentation is not explained anywhere; the overall effect is thus to focus on the ‘worst’ case 53 
scenarios, which are emphasized in their text, and on the ‘central’ case scenarios, which are 54 
emphasized in their graphical presentation of results. Furthermore, conclusions that only apply for 55 
‘worst’ case scenarios (such as the aforementioned claims that shale gas is ‘worse’ than coal for the 56 
various impacts) are presented as though they are always true. As a result, overall, the Stamford and 57 
Azapagic paper therefore gives the impression of much more severe impacts than are likely ever to 58 
be the case; it has thus been seized upon by environmental objectors to shale gas. Second, the 59 
analysis assumes that various ‘dirty’ environmental practices, allowed under lax regulatory regimes 60 
in the USA, will operate in the UK, when it should be obvious from the established legal framework 61 
that they will not. Extreme statements such as ‘shale gas might be 98 times worse than North Sea 62 
gas and 18 times worse than … coal …’ follow from their analyses that incorporate both assumptions 63 
in combination: that production per well will be very low; and that dirty environmental practices 64 
which are already illegal in the UK (such as unrestrained dumping of contaminated drilling waste 65 
without treatment, subsurface injection of wastewaters, and the use of various banned chemicals 66 
that damage the stratospheric ozone layer) will for some inexplicable reason be permitted. Third, 67 
the authors argue that a developer will need to undertake a detailed analysis of every well site to 68 
determine shale gas output and regulatory authorities will need to approve these analyses before 69 
drilling is allowed to begin, to establish that the well will produce enough gas to justify the 70 
environmental impact of its drilling.  71 
 72 
On the basis of geotechnical and physical properties, the Barnett Shale of Texas is a good analogue 73 
for the Bowland Shale of northern England (e.g., [2]), the UK’s principal shale gas resource (e.g., [3]). 74 
Many numerical values for the Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR) of shale gas per well have been 75 
published; Stamford and Azapagic [1] thus adopted for their analysis ‘best’, central and ‘worst’ case 76 
values of 3.0, 1.0 and 0.1 billion cubic feet (bcf, measured under standard conditions; 77 
1 bcf ≈ 2.83x107 m3 = 28.3 Mm3). The source they cited for this information [4] gives, respectively, 78 
10.0, 1.0, 0.7 and 0.02 bcf as the maximum, mean, median and minimum EUR values for the Barnett 79 
Shale and also includes a cumulative frequency graph that shows the 5th and 95th percentile values as 80 
0.2 and 3.0 bcf. However, the data thus presented were based on a survey in 2003; the design 81 
strategy of shale gas wells has changed markedly since then: wells are nowadays drilled horizontally 82 
within gas-bearing formations and fracked at multiple ‘perforation clusters’, rather than being drilled 83 
vertically and fracked at a single stratigraphic horizon as was formerly the case. Although the 84 
properties of the Barnett Shale vary in a complex manner across different spatial scales and from 85 
place to place (e.g., [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]), by fracking at multiple points within it (8 perforation 86 
clusters per horizontal ‘lateral’ being one standard strategy; e.g., [10]) the likelihood of very low 87 
yields of shale gas is significantly reduced. The need to quantify the available resource over an 88 
appropriate spatial scale has long been appreciated in the shale gas industry; for example, a report 89 
to potential investors a decade ago [11] stated ‘The Barnett Shale is a highly complex reservoir. 90 
Significant variability of well results exists even within concentrated areas. As the industry has yet to 91 
figure out how to identify the good wells from the bad …, a large acreage position is a necessity in 92 
order to minimize the risks and allow the law of large numbers to take effect.’ The same point, that 93 
output should be considered for developments as a whole, not on a well-by-well basis, is equally 94 
applicable to lifecycle analysis. The recent study by Browning et al. [12], which utilized data from 95 
more than 15,000 Barnett Shale wells drilled by 2010, determined mean EUR values for different 96 
localities ranging from 0.4 to 4.3 bcf, the principal factor governing this variation being the rate of 97 
decline of shale gas output once production has begun (e.g., [13], [14]). Other factors, such as 98 
taxation policies and the pricing of other energy resources, including alternative sources of shale gas, 99 
also influence the point of diminishing returns at which no further attempt is made to produce shale 100 
gas from any particular well (e.g., [15]).  101 
 102 
Insufficient is currently known about the properties of the Bowland Shale to determine precisely 103 
where it will fall within this range of variation for the Barnett Shale, but there is no basis for the 104 
assumption made by Stamford and Azapagic that anyone has any intention to develop wells with 105 
EUR as low as 0.1 bcf in the UK. The large number (many thousands) of wells that will be needed if 106 
shale gas is to have any significant impact on UK energy supply means that the aforementioned ‘law 107 
of large numbers’ will be applicable. Thus, the estimation by Browning et al. [12], that ~29000 wells 108 
will have been completed within the Barnett Shale by 2030 and that the resulting production will 109 
have amounted to ~45000 bcf of shale gas by 2050, indicates a mean EUR per well of ~1.5 bcf. We 110 
therefore agree with Stamford and Azapagic [1] that 3 bcf is reasonable as a ‘best case’ value for 111 
EUR per well in the UK and/or in the Bowland Shale. However, based on the above reasoning we 112 
would consider ~1.5 bcf as a reasonable ‘central’ figure, rather than their 1.0 bcf. Likewise, we would 113 
regard their ‘central’ figure of 1.0 bcf as a reasonable ‘worst case’ value for the EUR per UK and/or 114 
Bowland Shale well, since anything less would be uneconomic under UK conditions, and consider 115 
their ‘worst case’ figure of 0.1 bcf to be so far off track that it should never have been introduced in 116 
the first place. For comparison, both Mackay and Stone [16] and Bond et al. [17] have favoured ’best 117 
case’, ‘central’ and ‘worst case’ production figures of 5, 3 and 2 bcf under UK conditions, rather 118 
higher values than we now support and even more at odds with Stamford and Azapagic [1]. 119 
 120 
Stamford and Azapagic [1] call for ‘tight’ regulation of the UK shale gas industry, notably with regard 121 
to stringent controls on drilling waste disposal, compulsory reduced-emission well completions, and 122 
careful estimation of ultimate recovery before commencing drilling in order to avoid high emissions 123 
associated with a low-output well. However, this putative industry is already covered by default by 124 
many regulations, including the EU Mining Waste Directive [18], as incorporated into UK law ([19] 125 
for England and Wales, with similar regulations for Scotland [20] and Northern Ireland), and the EU 126 
Water Framework Directive [21] with its daughter Groundwater Directives [20, 22]; a range of 127 
regulatory agencies have roles in this process (Fig. 1). A consultation took place in 2013 regarding 128 
many aspects of shale gas regulation in the UK [23, 24]. This process established no lack of clarity 129 
regarding the requirement to treat solid drilling waste (drill chippings, etc.), so no new regulation of 130 
this aspect was necessary. On the other hand, it established a need to clarify regulations governing 131 
groundwater use in relation to shale gas production; as a result, new regulations, compliant with the 132 
underlying directives, were issued in February 2014 [25]. One consequence of this regulatory 133 
framework is that ‘flowback fluid’ from fracking will have to be stored in closed containers and 134 
ultimately treated, rather than stored in open tanks or disposed of by borehole injection, as is 135 
common practice in the USA, thus significantly reducing the potential for harmful environmental 136 
impacts. The analysis by Stamford and Azapagic [1] indeed assumed that flowback fluid from a 137 
future UK shale gas industry would likewise be stored and treated; this aspect of their analysis was, 138 
thus, consistent with the applicable regulatory framework and, therefore, entirely reasonable. 139 
However, as regards the first of the three specific regulatory requirements called for by Stamford 140 
and Azapagic [1],  stringent controls on drilling waste disposal, the 2013 consultation [23] did not 141 
mention ‘landfarming’ (i.e., uncontained dumping of untreated drilling waste, irrespective of any 142 
contamination therein, on the land), for the simple reason that this practice has long (since 1994 143 
[26]) been illegal in the UK: even from shallow drinking-water wells, boreholes cuttings have to be 144 
disposed to landfill. In response to this regulatory regime, specialist contractors for safe disposal of 145 
drilling waste have been established [27] and well operators are totally familiar with this 146 
requirement. Thus, although ‘landfarming’ is a common U.S. practice, there is no possibility that it 147 
will be allowed for shale gas wells in the UK. Nevertheless, all but the ‘low’ calculations of 148 
environmental impacts by Stamford and Azapagic [1] assume that some or all of the drilling waste 149 
from a given shale gas well will be disposed of by ‘landfarming’; as a result, the effects that they 150 
have calculated are significantly exaggerated. As regards their second proposal, compulsory 151 
reduced-emission well completions, Stamford and Azapagic [1] drew upon the Mackay and Stone 152 
(2013) report [16] for guidance about UK shale gas practice, without noting that one of its key 153 
recommendations was, indeed, compulsory reduced-emission well completions. Furthermore, the 154 
UK government’s response [28] to MacKay and Stone [16] (published in April 2014; i.e., months 155 
before the Stamford and Azapagic paper [1] was finalized) accepted all its recommendations, 156 
including the principle that UK shale gas boreholes should adopt these ‘green completion 157 
techniques’, whereby (except for safety reasons) venting or flaring of methane will be prohibited. 158 
The ‘central’ and ‘worst’ case calculations by Stamford and Azapagic [1], which include methane 159 
emissions during well drilling and completion, thus also exaggerate the resulting impacts. Their third 160 
proposal, careful estimation of ultimate recovery before commencing drilling in order to avoid high 161 
emissions associated with a low-output well, would appear to mean a requirement for detailed 162 
analysis of each proposed well site to estimate its shale gas production, followed presumably by 163 
approval of these production estimates by a designated regulatory authority.  We are not aware of 164 
any previous suggestion of anything like this as a basis for regulation of shale gas. We indeed see no 165 
necessity for any regulator to become involved in the proposed details of the development strategy 166 
for shale gas, on a well-by-well basis; if, despite the best efforts of the developer, the occasional UK 167 
shale gas well proves unproductive, it will be a commercial loss for the developer, not an issue over 168 
which any regulator need become involved.  169 
 170 
The first impact noted by Stamford and Azapagic [1], whereby shale gas will in their view be ‘worse’ 171 
than coal, concerns terrestrial ecotoxicity; in their view, regarding this particular impact, shale gas 172 
may be as much as 30 times more polluting than coal, in terms of pollution per unit energy output. 173 
However, it is evident that this inference results from the assumption that only 0.1 bcf of shale gas is 174 
produced from a well (an unrealistically low and uneconomic value for shale gas wells in general; see 175 
above), combined with the assumption that all the associated drilling waste is disposed of by 176 
‘landfarming’ (i.e., it is dumped, untreated on surrounding land, so any contaminants therein pollute 177 
the underlying soil). As already noted, this method of disposal of drilling waste is forbidden in the UK 178 
and elsewhere within the EU; any consequences that it might have for the future shale gas industry 179 
are, therefore, irrelevant. Stamford and Azapagic indeed seem oblivious of the long-term and 180 
widespread environmental impacts of former coal mines represented by perennial discharges of 181 
polluted mine water, which often remain polluted for centuries and even millennia [29]. In contrast, 182 
the lack of hydraulic connectivity to any recharge area, which results in the absence of any driving 183 
head, together with insufficient permeability (even in the fracked zones), mean that no such 184 
scenario can reasonably be anticipated in the case of abandoned shale gas wells ([20], [30]). The only 185 
part of the Stamford and Azapagic analysis of terrestrial ecotoxicity that has any relevance is for 186 
their ‘best case’ scenario, of 3 bcf of shale gas per well, as this was assumed to be associated with 187 
safe disposal of the drilling waste rather than ‘landfarming’. Stamford and Azapagic briefly noted 188 
that if this approach were to be followed, shale gas would indeed become one of the least polluting 189 
energy technologies from the point of view of terrestrial ecotoxicity. This is indeed evident from 190 
their Fig. 4, where as a ‘best’ case scenario the impact of shale gas was assessed as ~0.15 grammes 191 
of dichlorobenzene-equivalent (g DCB*) per kilowatt-hour, higher than the value of 0.13 g DCB* 192 
kWh-1 for North Sea gas but lower than the values for all other energy sources considered. However, 193 
this particular case was not mentioned in their abstract, conclusions, or research highlights. 194 
 195 
Regarding the second impact, photochemical ozone, Stamford and Azapagic [1] asserted that 196 
‘Leakage of [volatile organic compounds] during the removal of H2S (sweetening) is the main 197 
potential cause of [photochemical ozone] (photochemical smog) in the life cycle of shale gas.’ They 198 
also stated that the assumption underlying their ‘central’ case, that if half of the gas that is produced 199 
requires sweetening (H2S removal), a photochemical ozone impact about 9 times higher than that of 200 
North Sea gas will result. The basis underlying both these assertions was not stated and so both 201 
remain unclear. It is a long-standing assumption that much of the ‘conventional’ North Sea gas used 202 
in the UK is derived from Carboniferous source rocks similar to the Bowland Shale; some of it is sour, 203 
much of it is not (e.g., [31]). Even in the absence of any data, there was thus no obvious reason for 204 
Stamford and Azapagic to assume that the mix should be any different for shale gas obtained, say, 205 
from the Bowland Shale, compared with ‘conventional’ North Sea gas. Nonetheless, they might have 206 
made estimates of the range of H2S concentration in shale gas produced from the Bowland Shale, 207 
based on the available information that reported sulphur concentrations in Carboniferous 208 
mudstones in England have an upper bound of ~9-10% and are often much less (e.g., [32], [33], 209 
[34]). Furthermore, should they be necessary, technologies for ‘sweetening’ gas are standard and 210 
readily applicable to production on the scale envisaged for future shale gas pads in the UK, and the 211 
decision-making process for how to choose the optimum technology to suit a particular flow rate 212 
and gas composition is well established (e.g., [35], [36]). Stamford and Azapagic [1] did not state 213 
what H2S concentration within shale gas they consider problematic, nor what sweetening technology 214 
they envisage as being used, nor what proportion of volatile organic compounds in any fugitive 215 
emissions from it might be anticipated, so  it is not possible to check their calculations in relation to 216 
this topic. Nonetheless, some ‘sweetening’ technologies (e.g., [37]) do not use volatile organic 217 
compounds, and so could be adopted if fugitive emissions of these are considered an issue, 218 
whereupon such emissions would be reduced to zero. In fact, comparative chemical and isotopic 219 
analyses of shale gas from the Preese Hall – 1 well, within the Bowland Shale, and ‘conventional’ gas 220 
from other sites in northern England, have been reported ([38]; Table 1). These analyses confirm the 221 
long-standing assumption that Carboniferous sediments are, indeed, typically the source of ‘North 222 
Sea gas’; for example, shale gas from the Preese Hall–1 well is chemically and isotopically very 223 
similar to ‘conventional’ gas from the nearby Elswick-1 well. In principle, any shale gas well may 224 
become ‘sour’ due to injection of sulphate-reducing bacteria within the fracking fluid; to guard 225 
against this possibility, a biocide agent is added to the fluid. However, thermal decomposition of a 226 
standard sulphate-based biocide has been inferred to be the cause of the ‘souring’ observed in some 227 
shale gas wells [39]; a different agent can thus be substituted. Future development plans for shale 228 
gas in northern England can thus proceed with confidence on the basis that H2S concentrations will 229 
be no different from those in ‘conventional’ natural gas. Furthermore, at all sites studied the H2S 230 
concentrations in the gas that was analysed were measured as zero (Table 1). As is customary for 231 
safety reasons, for projects carried out under UK jurisdiction, H2S sensors were in operation at the 232 
Preese Hall-1 well but were not triggered, indicating that concentrations did not exceed 10 ppm [40]. 233 
It is on the basis of both kinds of measurement that H2S concentrations are assumed to be zero for 234 
the purposes of planning other shale gas projects in the UK (e.g., [41, 42]). Nonetheless, if H2S is 235 
present in any UK shale gas well it is clear that the operator is required to remove it (e.g., [43]), not 236 
allow it to vent into the atmosphere. In addition, Stamford and Azapagic [1] reported that, as 237 
regards creation of photochemical ozone, ‘In the worst case, shale gas might be 98 times worse than 238 
North Sea gas and 18 times worse than the coal power life cycle.’ However, this calculation was for 239 
their notional ‘worst case’ well from which the ultimate recovery of shale gas was specified as only 240 
0.1 bcf (2.83 Mm3), although 0.31 Mm3 (0.011 bcf) of this, or 11%, was for some reason assumed to 241 
be able to escape during well construction, contributing to the creation of photochemical ozone. 242 
Well construction practices that are allowable in the USA typically result in leakage in the range 0.6-243 
3.2% [44], but the proportion will be less in the U.K. due to the requirements of more stringent 244 
regulation ([17], [28]; see also below). Stamford and Azapagic [1] are, of course, correct that sound 245 
well construction should be standard in shale gas development to avoid fugitive emissions of gas; 246 
others have already made this point (e.g., [20], [30]), as well as noting, aside from any possible issue 247 
over fugitive gas emissions into the atmosphere, that poor well construction can result in gas 248 
contamination of aquifers [45]. However, we do not consider that adoption of such an extreme case 249 
as this, combining an extreme upper bound for fugitive emissions with what we established above is 250 
an extreme lower bound for gas recovery, and expressing the environmental impact per unit of gas 251 
recovery, rather than in any absolute terms, is a reasonable way to quantify the potential 252 
environmental impact of shale gas. 253 
 254 
Depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer is the third environmental impact for which Stamford and 255 
Azapagic [1] considered shale gas to be potentially more polluting than coal. In their view, this high 256 
potential impact results from two major factors, primarily leakage of the ozone-depleting gas halon 257 
1211 (bromochlorofreon; bromochlorodifluoromethane; CBrClF2) as a result of its use in fire-258 
suppression systems and cooling plants for gas pipelines. The second factor, in their view, the use of 259 
diesel engines to power plant at drilling sites, resulting in emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), which 260 
also cause ozone-depletion, will be discussed below. As regards halon 1211, the UK is a signatory to 261 
the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which banned the production of halons from 1 January 1994, although 262 
trade in these chemicals continues as it is legal to recycle them between permitted installations. 263 
Information on this topic is widely available (e.g., [46]); the applicable law ([47], [48]) only permits 264 
continued use of halon 1211 within the EU in a few situations such as in fire-suppression systems in 265 
aircraft, warships, and military vehicles. None of these remaining permitted uses of halon 1211 266 
therefore has any bearing on energy production. A different halon (halon 1301; 267 
bromotrifluoromethane; CBrF3; which Stamford and Azapagic did not mention) is currently 268 
permitted within the EU for use in fire-suppression systems in gas industry facilities: however, it 269 
passed its ‘cut-off date’ on 31 December 2010, meaning that no new installations are permitted; and 270 
will reach its ‘end date’ on 31 December 2020, when all existing installations will have to be 271 
decommissioned. Since no new gas installations using any form of halon will be permitted, any 272 
expansion of the UK shale gas industry will not add to halon emissions beyond those that would 273 
have occurred anyway; we are in any case unaware of any part of the existing UK gas distribution 274 
infrastructure that currently uses any form of halon, at all. The situation is rather different in the 275 
USA, where halons 1211 and 1203 continue to be widely used in the energy sector (even though 276 
new halons cannot be produced) as a result of large-scale trading in recycled halons, users being 277 
merely ‘encouraged’ to switch to alternatives, and with no timetable for phasing them out (e.g., [49], 278 
[50]). This is one of several aspects in which the regulation of the energy sector in the USA is lax 279 
compared with the UK (cf. [2]). There is therefore no reason why expansion of the UK shale gas 280 
industry should be considered responsible for ANY depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer as a 281 
result of emission of halons.   282 
 283 
Regarding NOx emissions, diesel engines powering plant at shale gas drilling sites count, in EU 284 
terminology, as ‘non-road mobile machinery’ (NRMM), and so are regulated on a par with other 285 
forms of NRMM, such as railway locomotives and inland waterway boats. The applicable EU directive 286 
[51] has introduced a series of increasingly stringent regulations for NOx emissions from NRMM, the 287 
current set being designated as EU Stage IIIB. Stamford and Azapagic [1] did not state for what 288 
specification of diesel engine their emissions data were obtained. However, they stated that the 289 
software that they used was released in 2010, making it clear that its inputs were based on older 290 
regulations that allowed much more polluting emissions than at present, making them irrelevant to 291 
predicting emissions by a future UK shale gas industry and likely to result in significant exaggeration 292 
of any effect. Stage IIIB – compliant diesel engines for powering drilling machinery are already 293 
available (e.g., [52]) and so can be used in shale gas development. Older equipment enjoys so-called 294 
‘grandfather rights’ with respect to EU emission regulations (i.e., it only has to comply with the 295 
regulations in force when it was manufactured, not subsequent amendments), and so could in 296 
principle be used instead, to develop shale gas in the UK in a more polluting manner than would 297 
otherwise be possible. However, it is straightforward to adapt such equipment to make it Stage IIIB 298 
compliant, by adding urea (diaminomethanone; CO(NH2)2) to the diesel fuel to catalytically 299 
decompose NOx and by slightly enriching the fuel mix to produce less NOx in the first place [53]; 300 
such measures could easily be specified in permissions to develop shale gas and would only add 301 
marginally to costs. Of course, as Stamford and Azapagic [1] noted, it is likely that many UK shale gas 302 
developments will take place at sites where mains electricity is available, so the resulting 303 
contributions to NOx emissions will reflect the national mix of generating plant and will be even 304 
lower than if Stage IIIB–compliant diesel engines were being used. 305 
 306 
Regarding the most familiar environmental impact of shale gas, its Global Warming Potential (GWP), 307 
Stamford and Azapagic [1] made best, central and worst-case estimates of 412, 462 and 1102 308 
grammes of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated (QE, in gCO2* kWh-309 
1). They compared these with a figure of 1068 gCO2* kWh-1 for coal; thus, in their view shale gas is 310 
only potentially ‘worse’ than coal for GWP as a worst case scenario. However, it is more customary 311 
to express GWP per unit of energy content of any fuel (QT) and in SI units (where 1 kWh = 3.6 MJ). 312 
Taking the figure of 52.5% for the combustion efficiency for electricity generation, from Stamford 313 
and Azapagic [1], their results equate to 60, 67 and 161 gCO2* MJ-1 for the best, central and worst-314 
case estimates of QT, respectively. Such figures, expressed in terms of ‘CO2 equivalent’, factor in the 315 
GWP of methane emissions, this being a very potent greenhouse gas (its impact being typically 316 
expressed over a 100 year timescale as a ‘GWP100’ value). Stamford and Azapagic [1] stated that 317 
their results are broadly comparable with other studies, such as the 84-114 gCO2* MJ-1 range for QT 318 
for shale gas production under U.S. conditions, determined by Howarth et al (2011) [44], which 319 
incorporates the impact of methane as GWP100 and has been converted into equivalent units for 320 
comparison. However, they are far higher than the 2.8-6.9 gCO2* MJ-1 (i.e., 10-25 gCO2* kWh-1) 321 
range of mean values of QT per well based on central production assumptions, determined by 322 
MacKay and Stone (2013) [16] for different sets of regulatory conditions potentially applicable to a 323 
future UK shale gas industry, this being a study that Stamford and Azapagic [1] cited. Furthermore, 324 
as already noted, the UK government’s response [28] to MacKay and Stone [16] (published months 325 
before the Stamford and Azapagic paper [1] was finalized) accepted its recommendation to prohibit 326 
(except for safety reasons) the venting or flaring of methane during the drilling or completion of UK 327 
shale gas wells. This is the essential reason why the subsequent analysis by Bond et al. (2014) [17] 328 
has reported QT values of 1.7-3.0 gCO2* MJ-1, even lower than MacKay and Stone (2013) [16]; it has 329 
excluded potential contributions from activities that will not be permitted in the UK. Like for other 330 
potential impacts of shale gas, the analysis of GWP by Stamford and Azapagic [1] has evidently 331 
exaggerated the impact due to failure to consider the regulatory regime that will apply in the UK. 332 
 333 
2. Conclusion 334 
Overall, we consider that through their combination of tacitly assuming that dirty environmental 335 
practices that are already illegal in the EU and UK will nevertheless be followed there, and their 336 
emphasis on worst-case scenarios in which wells are assumed to yield unrealistically low amounts of 337 
shale gas, Stamford and Azapagic have seriously exaggerated the potential environmental impact of 338 
a future UK shale gas industry. 339 
 340 
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 523 
Figure caption 524 
 525 
Figure 1. Flowchart illustrating the procedure for obtaining permission for a shale gas exploration 526 
well in the UK. This diagram, modified from Fig. 5 of [43], illustrates the variant of the process 527 
applicable in Scotland, where environmental and planning issues are devolved to Scottish 528 
government agencies but energy policy and prevention of work-related accidents are matters 529 
reserved for the UK government. DECC denotes the UK Department for Energy and Climate Change; 530 
SEPA is the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (whose role would be exercised by the 531 
Environment Agency in England or by Natural Resources Wales in Wales); and HSE denotes the UK 532 
Health and Safety Executive. Also included are the UK Coal Authority and the ‘local authority’, which 533 
is whichever of Scotland’s 32 unitary ‘council areas’, ranging in population from ~21,000 (the Orkney 534 
Islands) to ~593,000 (Glasgow City), in which the proposed well is located. As part of the process of 535 
granting planning permission, the local authority will expect the developer to engage in public 536 
consultation; the developer will also have to negotiate with the landowner for site access. 537 
Furthermore, the Scottish government may ‘recall’ the process of granting planning permission and 538 
determine this aspect for itself. 539 
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